The original Ehrenstein illusion was first described by Walter Ehrenstein senior (Ehrenstein, 1941 (Ehrenstein, , 1954 . It is generated by a configuration of four line segments which induce the perception of a so-called illusory figure at the centre of the configuration (Fig 1a) . This illusion is part of a class of visual perceptual phenomena referred to as contrast or brightness illusions.
Introduction
The original Ehrenstein illusion was first described by Walter Ehrenstein senior (Ehrenstein, 1941 (Ehrenstein, , 1954 . It is generated by a configuration of four line segments which induce the perception of a so-called illusory figure at the centre of the configuration (Fig 1a) .
This illusion is part of a class of visual perceptual phenomena referred to as contrast or brightness illusions (e.g. Spillmann, 1977) , as for example the Hermann grid illusion (Ehrenstein, 1941; Spillmann, 1994; Schiller & Carvey, 2005) or the so-called Mach band phenomena (Mach, 1865; Fiorentini, 1972) . It has been assumed that the Ehrenstein illusion might be a particular case of simultaneous contrast (e.g. Spillmann, Fuld, & Neumeyer, 1984) , a subjective contrast phenomenon where surfaces surrounded by regions of opposite contrast polarity appear brighter or darker than they are according to psychophysical measurement (e.g. Fiorentini, 1972) . Illusory figures, however, are phenomenally different from simultaneous contrast displays and may produce subjective contrast effects that are considerably more pronounced.
Phenomenal characteristics
The most salient phenomenal attribute of the Ehrenstein illusion is the apparent brightness enhancement at the centre of the configuration, the latter being systematically perceived as brighter (Fig 1a) or as darker (Fig 1b) than the general background, the brightness enhancement effect being more pronounced than the darkness enhancement (Spillmann, Fuld, & Gerrits, 1976) . These asymmetrical perceptual sensations of brightness/darkness enhancement or subjective contrast are considered illusory because they have no physical origin, given that the luminance at the centre of the figure is strictly identical to the background luminance.
Perceptions of structural depth (Coren, 1972 ) and figure-ground segregation (Kennedy, 1978; Spillmann & Dresp, 1995; Watanabe, Nanez, & Moreno, 1995) are combined with the apparent brightness enhancement in several variations of the Ehrenstein illusion. A phenomenal description or perceptual hypothesis based on a cognitive interpretation of the illusion (Rock, 1987; Parks, 1986) as it occurs in the classic configurations shown here below (Figs 1a and 1b) may be given in terms of "a cross structure that is partially occluded by a surface at its centre".
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Variations of the Ehrenstein illusion have been generated (Fraser, 1983; Prazdny, 1983 Prazdny, , 1985 Parks, 1982 show how local characteristics of the configuration may influence this illusion, inducing the perception of a diamond-like surface at the centre as shown above (Fig 1a) , that of a more square-like shape (Fig 1c) , or a disk (Fig 1d) . (Fig 2a) .
However, the frequency with which such perceptions occur is significantly lower and the times to make a decision are noticeably longer than with Ehrenstein figures where all inducers have the same contrast polarity (Fig 2b) . 1996) . Other perceptual phenomena such as apparent motion and stereopsis (Ramachandran, 1985 (Ramachandran, , 1986 or tilt and motion aftereffects (Smith & Over, 1975; 1979) have been linked to displays exhibiting subjective surface contrast and illusory contours, including the Ehrenstein illusion, which was found to be subject to an apparent displacement phenomenon when combined with random-dot motion effects . 
Theoretical accounts
Cognitive theories of perception (Gregory, 1972; Rock, 1987) suggest that visual processing of illusory contour figures operates generally and predominantly through top-down processing. Such processing is to enable the perceptual system to resolve stimulus ambiguities in the most plausible manner by exploiting learnt knowledge about our physical environment.
Such knowledge produces the rules of perceptual organization that govern our way of seeing the outside world. Since objects in natural biological environments are often camouflaged, partially hidden, or occluded, perceptual cognition has "learnt" to rely on statistically driven problem solving processes to restore potentially important information about shape surfaces and object contours that may be lacking in the physical environment or stimulus. In the case of the Ehrenstein illusion, such problem solving (Rock, 1987) would generate a perceptual hypothesis or cognitive interpretation, as mentioned above, in terms of a disk-shaped surface superimposed on a cross, giving rise to the apparent contrast effect that is seen in the centre of the display at the physical gap between the radial inducing lines. Such a perceptual interpretation gives the stimulus a definitive and plausible meaning and accounts for apparently missing object parts by suggesting that the inducing lines would "continue" behind the disk. The attempt to understand both aspects of perceptual phenomena like the Ehrenstein illusion on the basis of principles of perceptual organization that take into account the physical constraints a stimulus imposes on the functioning of an organism which has evolved to perceive it was one of the core issues addressed by Gestalt theory, which is mentioned earlier here. The work by Walter Ehrenstein senior himself, which was carried on with much enthusiasm and success by his son Walter Ehrenstein junior subsequently, has laid the foundations of a large body of scientific investigations into this particular phenomenon, and others closely related ones.
